Damning Senate Report on Massive Secret Service Failures

The Lead Advance Agent for the Secret Service was told in advance of the July 13th rally that “credible intelligence” existed of a threat against President Trump

The Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs just released a blistering 133-page report on the many failures of the Secret Service in the first assassination attempt on President Trump that took place on July 13, 2024. As Senator Rand Paul noted, “Our initial findings clearly show a series of multiple failures of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and an inexcusable dereliction of duty. Not only did USSS fail to ensure the [American Glass Research] AGR roof was adequately covered, they were also aware of a suspicious individual with a rangefinder for at least 27 minutes and did not delay proceedings or remove former President Trump from the stage, even after being informed that the suspicious individual was on the roof of the AGR building.”

The most damning information from the Senate Report revealed that the Lead Advance Agent for the Secret Service was told in advance of the July 13th rally that “credible intelligence” existed of a threat against President Trump. The Lead Advance Agent told the committee that on July 9, 2024, “she received a call from the second supervisor of the Trump detail, telling her that USSS counter snipers would be assigned to the rally.” The Lead Advance Agent stated that “the second supervisor of the Trump detail informed her that the reason USSS was assigning counter snipers was because of “credible intel” that he could not discuss further with her”:

Lead Advance Agent: He said that there was credible intelligence that he could not speak about, and that we were going to get Secret Service counter sniper advance for that reason.

Question: And did he say why he couldn’t speak about it? 

Lead Advance Agent: Because it was information that he wasn’t able to pass. 

Question: Did he say it was classified? 

Lead Advance Agent: He did not use the word “classified” on the phone, but from my general knowledge when you say that you cannot pass something on the phone, the understanding is that it’s classified and he can’t speak about it on the phone.

Despite this advance warning (and for reasons that remain unexplained) the Lead Advance Agent wrote in a security planning document that there was “no adverse intelligence” concerning Trump’s visit to Butler, PA. The Committee was told by numerous USSS personnel that “their expectation was that any credible threat or intelligence would appear in the planning document.” The Lead Advance Agent inexplicably also “did not inform her superiors or other USSS personnel involved with planning and securing the Butler rally that she was told of a threat.”

Moreover, on July 10, 2024, the USSS Pittsburgh Office sent a letter to the FBI requesting any intelligence related to former President Trump and the July 13 rally in Butler, PA. According to the Senate Report, the FBI did not respond to the Pittsburgh Office’s letter or share any intelligence information with the USSS in response to the letter. Then, on the morning of July 13th, another USSS Intelligence Agent called USSS headquarters and asked if any adverse intelligence had been developed concerning the visit. Despite the earlier warning that was given to the Lead Advance Agent, USSS headquarters told the intelligence agent that no information had been received. 

Compounding these utterly inexplicable intelligence failures (failures so great that we find it hard to accept them as failures) was the fact that USSS Advance Agents had requested “additional resources” but were denied. It’s worth highlighting that the SS agents who were requesting the additional assets were totally unaware of the “credible intelligence” of a threat against President Trump.

Additionally, the USSS Lead Advance Agent (who WAS aware of the “credible intelligence” of a threat against President Trump) told the Committee that Trump’s USSS detail requested Counter Assault Team liaisons to help coordinate tactical assets in advance of the July 13 rally, but USSS denied this request. In spite of the denial, the Lead Advance Agent again failed to relay the “credible intelligence” to any members of Trump’s team - or to any other member of the USSS.

In addition to the significant intelligence failures preceding the July 13th Rally, there were numerous failures that transpired on the day of the assassination attempt on President Trump.

USSS personnel were notified of a suspicious person with a rangefinder (Thomas Matthew Crooks) around the AGR building nearly a full half-hour (approximately 27 minutes) before the shooting. This was relayed to the USSS Security Room at approximately 5:44 pm and to the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader at 5:45 pm. For context, Crooks began firing on President Trump at 6:11 pm. Shortly after the initial reports, USSS personnel, including a Counter Sniper Response agent, engaged in an on-the-ground effort to locate the individual (Crooks).

However, the USSS Lead Advance Agent, Site Agent, and Site Counterpart all told the Committee they did not receive any of this crucial information and “therefore did not know local law enforcement had identified a suspicious person with a rangefinder – and that those local officers later lost track of this individual – until after shots were fired.” This complete lack of communication and coordination is repeated throughout the Senate Report.

Three full minutes before any shots were fired by Crooks, a local law enforcement officer sent out a radio alert that there was an individual on the AGR roof. This information was delayed for a full minute and didn’t reach the USSS Security Room until approximately two minutes before Crooks fired. More warnings were missed. Twenty-two seconds before Crooks fired, a local officer sent out a radio alert that the individual on the AGR roof was armed, but this information was again somehow not relayed to key USSS personnel.

At no point in time did anyone act to remove President Trump from the stage. This most basic of failures does not appear to be properly addressed or explained in the Senate Report.

Additionally, shortly before shots were fired, a “USSS counter sniper saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with their guns drawn, but he did not alert former President Trump’s protective detail to remove him from the stage.” According to the Senate Report, The USSS counter sniper told the Committee that while seeing officers with their guns drawn “elevated” the threat level, the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage “did not cross [his] mind.” 

There are a number of other failures listed as well, including line-of-sight concerns and significant communications errors. We found it quite notable that “All of the local channels were recorded on July 13, but USSS radio transmissions were not.”

One bright spot (if you can call it that) was that Crooks was in the USSS counter sniper’s sights for “mere seconds” before he fired at Crooks. “The USSS partner of the USSS counter sniper who shot Crooks told the Committee he observed that “mere seconds” after his partner identified Crooks in his sights, the USSS counter sniper fired at Crooks.” One other item of note that has been the subject of many questions: “USSS counter snipers confirmed to the Committee that they did not require permission before they fired.”

Listed within the report are a summary of “Key Failures” by the Secret Service leading up to and including the events of that fateful day:

1. USSS failed to clearly define responsibilities for planning and security at the July 13th rally: 

   1. USSS personnel responsible for planning in advance of the July 13 rally denied that they were individually responsible for planning or security failures and deflected blame.

   2. USSS Advance Agents told the Committee that planning and security decisions were made jointly, with no specific individual responsible for approval.

2. USSS failed to ensure the AGR Building was effectively covered:

   1. USSS identified the AGR building as a concern due to the line-of-sight from the roof to the stage, but did not take steps to ensure sufficient security measures were in place. 

   2. USSS knew that local snipers planned to set up inside the AGR building and USSS did not express objections or concerns about that placement.

   3. USSS personnel, including the USSS Counter Sniper Team Leader, did not enter the AGR building or go on the roof prior to the shooting. 

   4. One USSS Counter Sniper team, whose responsibility included scanning the area around the AGR building for threats, had an obstructed view of the AGR roof.

3. USSS failed to effectively coordinate with state and local law enforcement:

   1. USSS did not give state or local partners specific instructions for covering the AGR building, including the positioning of local snipers.

   2. USSS did not adequately consider state and local law enforcement operational plans.

   3. Communications at the July 13 rally were siloed and USSS did not ensure it could share information with local law enforcement partners in real time. 

4. USSS failed to provide resources for the July 13 rally that could have enhanced security:

   1. USSS denied specific requests for additional Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) capabilities and a Counter Assault Team liaison.

   2. A USSS Counter Surveillance Unit – which could have helped patrol the outer perimeter that included the AGR building – was not requested by USSS Advance Agents. 

5. USSS failed to communicate information about the suspicious person to key personnel, and failed to take action to ensure the safety of former President Trump:

   1. At approximately 5:45 pm, USSS personnel were notified that local law enforcement observed a suspicious person with a rangefinder near the AGR building. By 5:52 pm, at least eight USSS personnel had been informed. 

   2. Approximately two minutes before shots were fired, the USSS Security Room, located on the rally grounds, was told that there was an individual on the roof of the AGR building.

   3. Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS Counter Sniper observed local officers running towards the AGR building with guns drawn. 

The failures by the Secret Service are numerous - and compounding in their effect. The Lead Advance Agent’s failures appear to be so great as to be almost constant - including her unexplained failure to share the advance intelligence of a credible threat with the rest of the SS detail on July 13th.

The total lack of dissemination of the critical information regarding USSS headquarters’ knowledge of a credible threat to President Trump is both inexplicable and inexcusable. There needs to be a much greater level of explanation than is provided for in the Senate Report. Every single member of the USSS who was interviewed as part of the Senate Report told the Committee that this information was something they “absolutely” should have been aware of prior to the July 13 rally. Indeed, this was something that was being asked by SS agents immediately in the aftermath of the assassination attempt:

The FBI’s non-response to inquiries from the USSS Pittsburgh Office on July 10th - three days before the rally has also not been explained - despite the FBI’s July 12th arrest of Asif Merchant, “a Pakistan national with ties to Iran, [for] plotting to commit murder-for-hire” of U.S. government officials. Moreover, there has been no explanation for why USSS headquarters told the SS intelligence agent on the day of the rally that no adverse intelligence had been developed concerning the visit when the SS Lead Advance Agent had been told exactly the opposite on July 10th.

The level of incompetence by the USSS, the Advance Lead Agent along with the deafening silence from the FBI appears to be so great, so totally overwhelming, that it would appear that the only way it could actually be accomplished is through careful planning. This is a damning report - and one that we’re still wading through. We expect more damning revelations will be forthcoming.

Planned incompetence. Dangerous times.